The Asian-African (Bandung) Conference: Fact and Fiction

August 08, 2017 
/ Contributed By: Kyle Haddad-Fonda

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Map of Asian-African (Bandung) Conference participants

(CC BY-SA 2.5)


In the article below independent historian Kyle Haddad-Fonda describes the Asian-African Conference popularly known as the Bandung Conference which was the first significant gathering of independent and soon-to-be independent nations in Asia and Africa.

From April 18 to April 24, 1955, delegates from twenty-nine countries in Asia and Africa convened in Bandung, Indonesia, to discuss the common challenges their nations faced in navigating a postcolonial world. The Asianโ€“African Conference, popularly known as the Bandung Conference, was a sensation around the world. Never before had leaders from so many non-Western countries gathered together to make common cause. But the Conferenceโ€™s iconic status, coupled with a growing global sense of nostalgia for the supposedly optimistic days of the 1950s, means that many legends that have subsequently sprung up about the event are simply not true. Seldom has historical memory distorted and misrepresented any single event in quite so many different ways. Accordingly, it is valuable to include an extended discussion of the facts surrounding the Bandung Conference: how it was organized, who participated, what was said, andโ€”perhaps most importantโ€”what was not said.

The Asianโ€“African Conference was the brainchild of Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, who planned the proceedings in collaboration with the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, and Pakistan. These five men met in Bogor, Indonesia, in December 1954 to draft the Conferenceโ€™s agenda and to issue invitations.

After considerable debate, the five hosts agreed to send invitations to twenty-five countries. From the continent of Africa, they invited four of the five independent countries of the day: Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya. They declined to invite the fifth, South Africa, whose policy of apartheid was criticized in the Conferenceโ€™s final communiquรฉ. In addition to the four independent African countries, the conveners extended invitations to the Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana), Sudan (then under joint Britishโ€“Egyptian control), and the Central African Federation (modern-day Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The Central African Federation was the only invited country that did not agree to send a representative to Bandung.

Delegations from twenty-nine countries convened in Bandung on April 18, 1955, a date that Indonesian President Sukarno celebrated in his welcoming address as the anniversary of the beginning of the American Revolution. Sukarno praised the American War of Independence as โ€œthe first successful anti-colonial war in historyโ€ and quoted from Henry Wadsworth Longfellowโ€™s โ€œThe Midnight Ride of Paul Revere.โ€

Among the most prominent world leaders who attended the Conference were Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai. Most other countries sent high-ranking representatives, but not their heads of government. Nasser and Zhou attracted particular attention as newcomers to the international scene. The Bandung Conference was only Nasserโ€™s second foreign trip since leading the 1952 Free Officersโ€™ Revolution: his previous trip was a pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. For most of the delegates in attendance, the Bandung Conference was also the first time they had engaged with any representative of Communist China. Nehru, his daughter Indira Gandhi, U Nu, Nasser, and Zhou spent a considerable amount of social time with one another at the Conference.

In addition to the participating delegations, a variety of individuals from around the world came to observe the Conference in an unofficial capacity. These observers included two notable African Americans. One was the author Richard Wright, whose book The Color Curtain described his experiences in Bandung. Wright felt a connection between his identity as an African American and the identities of the non-Western leaders gathered in Bandung, whom he described as โ€œthe despised, the insulted, the hurt, the dispossessedโ€”in short, the underdogs of the human race.โ€ The other important African American to attend the Conference was Adam Clayton Powell, a Democratic congressman from New York whose district included Harlem. Powell was the only member of the American government to attend the Conference, which he did despite the objections of American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Dulles opposed the convening of the Asianโ€“African Conference on the grounds that it would offer a forum for Communist countries to criticize the West. He also worried that attendees at the Conference would condemn American- and British-led military alliances such as SEATO and CENTO. The British and French governments were especially concerned about the effect the Conference would have on their own colonies in Africa. The British government actively discouraged the Gold Coast and the Central African Federation from sending representatives to the Conference. The French ambassador in Washington asked Dulles to use his influence to convince the governments of Liberia and Ethiopia to decline their invitations as well, but Dulles refused to do so. Instead, he asserted that it would be best if pro-Western countries sent โ€œthe ablest possible representationโ€ in order to articulate the anti-Communist position. Dulles specifically singled out Lebanonโ€™s delegate, the Harvard-educated Charles Malik, as the kind of participant he hoped would attend the Conference.

The Asianโ€“African Conference is often misrepresented as the beginning of the โ€œNon-Aligned Movementโ€ of countries that sought to take a neutral position in the Cold War. While a few Conference attendees, led by Nehru, had begun by 1955 to advance a โ€œneutralistโ€ ideology, the reality was that the majority of countries in attendance in Bandung were explicitly aligned with the United States. During the Conferenceโ€™s plenary session, representatives of Iran, Iraq, the Philippines, Turkey, Cambodia, and Thailand all criticized the Soviet Union, with some delegates asserting that Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe were tantamount to colonialism. This discussion forced Zhou Enlai to speak in defense of the Communist bloc. Since the organizers of the Conference prioritized consensus, they produced a final communiquรฉ that said nothing about the ongoing Cold War.

Because the final communiquรฉ had to be palatable to the governments of twenty-nine countries, it was for the most part a fairly general document. It committed the signatories to cooperate to promote economic development in the region, including by exchanging technical assistance, but it specifically allowed them to continue accepting aid from governments outside the region, by which it meant the United States and the Soviet Union. It condemned โ€œcolonialism in all its manifestationsโ€ as โ€œan evil which should speedily be brought to an end,โ€ but it called explicitly for the independence of only three colonies: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The communiquรฉ also condemned racial discrimination and singled out South Africa as a country in which racism needed to be โ€œeradicated.โ€ Finally, the communiquรฉ asserted that the countries of Asia and Africa could promote world peace and called for โ€œuniversal disarmament.โ€

While the Asianโ€“African Conference did not itself signal the beginning of the Non-Aligned Movement, it did provide a setting in which several relationships that later helped launch that movement could be formed. In particular, Nehru and Nasser met for the first time in New Delhi en route to the Conference. When the Non-Aligned Movement was established in 1961 at the Belgrade Conference in Yugoslavia, Nehru and Nasserโ€”along with several non-Asian, non-African leaders such as Josip Broz Titoโ€”were among its most vocal proponents.

The delegates at the Asianโ€“African Conference did not establish any kind of permanent organization directly as a result of the Conference, but it did mark the beginning of a period of intense interest in promoting cooperation among Asian and African countries. In December 1957, another conference in Cairo founded the Asianโ€“African Peopleโ€™s Solidarity Organization, which, unlike the Asianโ€“African Conference, included the participation of the Soviet Union. The first president of an independent Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella, planned to host a second Asianโ€“African Conference in Algiers in 1965, but those plans were scuttled in part because of the coup that overthrew Ben Bella in June of that year and in part because of Chinese opposition to allowing the Soviet Union to attend.

Today, the Asianโ€“African Conference is often mythologized, especially by the current governments of participating countries, as an example of a spirit of cooperation among Third World countries that has since been lost. This impulse toward nostalgia often leads to the spread of incorrect information about the Conference. American scholar Robert Vitalis has catalogued erroneous reports, sometimes from official government publications, about the attendance in Bandung of various anticolonial leaders who were not in fact there, including Tito, Kwame Nkrumah, Fidel Castro, and Jomo Kenyatta.

Despite this confusion, the Asianโ€“African Conference must be recognized as an event that encouraged many leaders of developing countries to articulate a vision of global anti-imperialist cooperation beyond their own borders. The Conference was also a trigger for some governments, including those of China, Egypt, and Ghana, to begin to seek both domestic and international legitimacy by portraying themselves as exemplars of a commitment to Third World solidarity.

About the Author

Author Profile

Kyle Haddad-Fonda holds a DPhil in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. His dissertation analyzed the evolution of relations between China and the countries of the Middle East, especially Egypt and Algeria, in the mid-twentieth century. His current research focuses on more recent developments in Sino-Arab relations, and his articles on this topic have appeared in such publications as Foreign Policy, ChinaFile, and the Middle East Report.

CITE THIS ENTRY IN APA FORMAT:

Haddad-Fonda, K. (2017, August 08). The Asian-African (Bandung) Conference: Fact and Fiction. BlackPast.org. https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/asian-african-bandung-conference-fact-and-fiction/

Source of the Author's Information:

China and the Asianโ€“African Conference: Documents (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1955); Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asiaโ€“Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, trans. Molly Bondan (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981); George Kahin, The Asianโ€“African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1956); MEMCON John Jernegan, Jacques Vimont, and J. Jefferson Jones, 1 February 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955โ€“1957, vol. 18, 1โ€“2; MEMCON Charles Malik and John Foster Dulles, 9 April 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955โ€“1957, vol. 21, 82โ€“84; Robert Vitalis, โ€œThe Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong),โ€ Humanity 4 (2013): 261โ€“288; Richard Wright, The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference (1956; Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1995).

Further Reading